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This  paper  describes  how  computer-human  interaction  in 
ambient computing environments can be best informed by 
conceptualizing of such environments as problem solving 
systems. Typically, such systems comprise multiple human 
and technological agents that meet the demands imposed by 
problem constraints through dynamic collaboration. A key 
assertion  is  that  the  design  of  ambient  computing 
environments  towards  efficacious  human-machine 
collaboration  can  benefit  from  an  understanding  of 
competence  models  of  human-human  and  animal-animal 
collaboration.  Consequently,  design  principles  for  such 
environments  are  derived  from  a  review  of  competent 
collaboration  in  human  groups,  such  as  sport  teams,  and 
animal groups, such as wolf packs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
No matter what benefits are touted by the producers of new 
technology,  the  user  always  seems  to  experience  some 
workload  cost.  Consequently,  in  designing  ambient 
technologies, there is a risk of creating ubiquitous workload 
costs.  In  some  cases,  technology  can  be  designed  or 
implemented  so  poorly  that  the  workload  cost  is  greater 
than the workload saving, the so-called “make-work” cases. 
This article describes how ambient technologies can work 
in a coordinated way with human agents in order to create 
problem  solving  systems  (PSSs)  that  meet  the  demands 
imposed  by  the  problems  humans  face  throughout  the 
average day, while minimizing the workload costs that so 
often accompany technological innovation. 
AMBIENT PROBLEM SOLVING SYSTEMS 
A reason commonly proposed for problems associated with 
technology is that its design is driven primarily by advances 
in  technology  itself,  with  little  attention  to  human 
characteristics  or  the  problems  faced  by  humans. 
Consequently, researchers have proposed that the impetus 
for technological innovation should be steered away from 
advances in technological capabilities and towards making 
design more human- and problem-centered. 
However,  a  focus  on  the  problem,  the  human,  or  the 
technology, will fall short of informing design because each 
of  these  aspects  impacts  the  others  [c.f.,  4].  Problem 
constraints often impose demands that cannot be met given 
natural  human  limitations  in  cognitive  and  physical 
resources: For example, we can only count so fast or see so 
far.  One  solution  is  to  adapt  oneself  to  the  problem 
constraints: Training and practice at a given problem leads 
to cognitive and physical adaptations to problem constraints 
that  result  in  more  efficient  solution  processes  [3]. 
However, humans are often  unable or unwilling to adapt 
themselves  and  thus  turn  to  adapting  the  environment 
instead  [9].  Technology  is  a  form  of  environmental 
adaptation  that  effectively  augments  human  problem 
solving capabilities. 
Thus,  there  are  important  interactions  between  problem, 
human,  and  technology:  For  example,  a  change  in  the 
problem would impose different resource demands on the 
human,  and  thus  would  necessitate  a  change  in  the 
technology  used  to  augment  human  capabilities;  a 
hypothetical change  in  human resource  limitations  would 
affect the  need for augmentation  from technology; and a 
    
change in technology would affect the amount of resources 
the human would need to apply to the problem. Figure 1 
illustrates such interaction. 
The  joint  contribution  of  human  and  technological 
resources to solving our many everyday problems can be 
considered a PSS [c.f., 5, 13]. For example, when I type 
text from a book into a document on a computer, I place a 
pencil  on  the  book  parallel  to  the  last-read  line.  This  is 
because  it  is  difficult  to  locate  this  line  from  within  the 
overall text when looking from the screen to the book. The 
pencil is a featural singleton [29]; that is, a distinguishable 
feature  in  an  otherwise  relatively  homogenous  visual 
display.  Thus,  the  pencil  avoids  the  comprehensive 
searching  required  to  locate  less  distinguishable  features; 
that is, my line of text [24].  
The  pencil  placement  is  a  simple  and  effective  form  of 
technology.  An  implicit  awareness  of  the  interaction 
between human resource limits and the problem constraints 
drove  technological  innovation,  which,  in  turn,  created  a 
PSS  comprising  human  and  technological  agents  that 
together exhibited problem solving capabilities superior to 
human or technological problem solving capabilities alone: 
I  cannot  discriminate  between  lines  of  text  as  rapidly  as 
when using the pencil. 
Another  example  of  the  joint  contribution  of  human  and 
technological resources to problem solving is apparent in 
solutions to insight problems. When humans are trying to 
solve problems involving insight and creativity, they often 
experience “a-ha” moments, which are ephemeral and often 
unpredicted  moments  of  enhanced  cognitive  functioning 
[10,  11].  These  arise  frequently  during  periods  of 
relaxation, such as while in bed, toileting and showering, 
and become more difficult to recall as time elapses from 
their  onset,  which  presents  problems  with  regard  to 
capitalizing  upon  them.  Their  short  duration, 
unpredictability,  and  inconvenient  timing  might  be 
considered a natural human limitation: There would be no 
problem with capitalizing upon a-ha moments if we were 
able to remember permanently and lucidly everything that 
occurred  during  the  moment.  By  contrast,  we  do  not 
possess this faculty, and are aware of the nature of our “a-
ha” moments and so create an “insight PSS” by employing 
strategically  positioned  technological  devices  to  record 
these moments as fast and in as much detail as possible. 
These include note pads and tape-recorders, which we often 
leave by the bed. 
Furthermore, by identifying  areas of a problem in  which 
technology is employed to create a PSS, we can map out 
where the resource limitations of the human interact with 
the  problem  [c.f.,  8].  For  example,  a  large  quantity  of 
reminders pertaining to future actions that are left about a 
house  might  suggest  that  the  owner  has  a  problem  with 
prospective memory (remembering to take planned actions) 
[8].  These  reminders  might  be  in  the  form  of  notes, 
reminding the owner to visit the bank at lunchtime that day, 
and be found stuck on the inside of the individual’s closet, 
refrigerator door, and front door, so that they serve their 
function as the owner prepares for  work in  the  morning. 
Alternatively,  recalling  the  interactions  of  problem, 
technology and human, it might tell us something about the 
problem: Perhaps the individual’s day is very busy, making 
remembering to the visit the bank difficult, or the bank visit 
is  unusually  important,  making  forgetting  the  visit 
disastrous. 
While  these  are  simple  examples,  other  researchers  have 
been  exploring  similar  concepts  in  a  range  of  domains, 
including complex domains involving multiple human and 
technological agents. For example, Hutchins’ [6, 7] studies 
of  aircraft  cockpit  and  maritime  navigation  operations 
provided detailed examples of the interactive relationships 
between  problem  constraints,  human  resource  limits,  and 
technology.  In  the  following  quote,  Hutchins  [6] 
summarizes his cockpit research, and exemplifies the notion 
of  the  employment  of  technologies  that  extend  human 
resource limits and, in turn, create PSSs comprising both 
human and technological agents. Note that Hutchins also 
provides evidence that the nature of the cockpit components 
provides  a  “map”  of  the  shortcomings  of  the  human 
memory system in dealing with the demands imposed by 
cockpit problem constraints. 
The  cockpit  system  remembers  its  speeds 
[but]…[t]he memory of the cockpit…is not 
made  primarily  of  pilot  memory.  A 
complete  theory  of  individual  human 
memory  would  not  be  sufficient  to 
understand  that  which  we  wish  to 
understand  because  so  much  memory 
function takes place outside the individual. 
In  some  sense,  what  the  theory  of  human 
memory  explains  is  not  how  the  system 
works, but why this system must contain so 
many  components  that  are  functionally 
implicated  in  cockpit  memory,  yet  are 
external to the pilots themselves. (p. 286) 
In their daily lives, humans attempt to solve multiple and 
overlapping  problems  that  extend  over  space  and  time. 
Figure 1. The relations between problem constraints, 
human resource limitations, and technological innovation.    
Problem  constraints  can  also  vary  within  and  between 
problems. Consequently, the demands imposed on humans 
are changing constantly. For a simple example, imagine an 
individual is driving a car through a town when she receives 
a  telephone  call  on  a  cell-phone  from  a  business  client. 
There  will  be  a  change  in  the  demands  on  the  driver’s 
attentional  resources  when  the  telephone  conversation 
begins, because the driver must now allocate attention to 
the road ahead and the conversation. 
The changing demands imposed on a human are such that 
PSSs  are  often  dynamic:  Humans  may  recruit  more  or 
fewer human and technological agents and the agents might 
be  used  in  different  ways,  in  order  to  meet  changing 
demands  [c.f.,  6].  For  example,  the  driver  in  the  earlier 
example  might  employ  cruise  control,  a  technological 
agent, to be able to allocate more attention to the telephone 
conversation, or might employ a passenger, a human agent 
with “spare” attentional resources, to take the call. resume 
control of the car from the cruise agent. 
Figure 2 provides an alternative and hypothetical example. 
The figure demonstrates how the demands imposed on two 
different  types  of  human  resources  by  the  constraints  of 
three  different  problems  can  change  over  time,  and  how 
they  can  occasionally  exceed  an  individual  human’s 
resource limits. For simplicity, the problems are shown as 
being undertaken serially but, in reality, problems are often 
undertaken in parallel. The problem constraints in the latter 
half  of  the  time  period  of  problems  1  and  3  impose  a 
resource  demand  that  exceeds  an  individual  human’s 
limitations in resource type 1 (which might, for example, be 
that  of  working  memory)  indicated  by  areas  A  and  C. 
Similarly,  the  problem  constraints  throughout  problem  2 
impose  a  resource  demand  that  exceeds  an  individual 
human’s limitations in resource type 2 (which might, for 
example, be that of arm reach) indicated by area B. 
With regard to the example provided in Figure 2, the human 
might  create  a  PSS  comprising  a  set  of  human  and 
technological  agents  specific  to  overcoming  the  resource 
deficits indicated by areas A and C, so that the demands 
imposed  by  the  constraints  of  problems  1  and  3, 
respectively,  could  be  met.  Similarly,  the  human  might 
create a PSS comprising a different set of agents specific to 
overcoming the resource deficit indicated by area B, so that 
the demands imposed by the constraints of problem 2 could 
be met. Figure 3 is a schematic diagram demonstrating two 
such  PSSs.  The  systems  differ  in  terms  of  the  type  and 
number  of  agents  employed,  and,  in  turn,  the  interaction 
between  agents.  To  exemplify  the  notion  that  different 
configurations  of  agents  are  required  to  meet  different 
demands,  we  might  imagine  that  system  X  in  Figure  3 
would be able to meet the demands of problems 1 and 3 in 
Figure  2,  and  system  Y  in  Figure  3  would  be  able  to 
overcome the demands of problem 2 in Figure 2. 
Consequently, we argue that ambient technology is not a 
new concept. The pencil aiding copy-typing, and the note 
pad and tape recorder aiding insight capture, are two simple 
examples  of  how  we  create  ambient  technologies. 
Historically,  humans  have  contrived,  and  surrounded 
themselves  with  numerous  technological  agents  to  form 
PSSs  that  have  superior  problem  solving  capabilities  to 
humans  working  alone.  We  move  between  and  create 
multiple  and  overlapping  PSSs  continually  in  our  daily 
routines  without  realizing  it  [c.f.,  23].  The  handbrake 
handle in our car enables us to exert a force on our wheels 
that  is  beyond  our  physical  strength  and  the  telephone 
enables us to speak to people who are out of the range of 
our  voice.  These  technologies  have  been  driven 
predominantly by an understanding, often implicit, of the 
interactions  between  the  problem  constraints,  human 
limitations, and technology. 
Modern  ambient  technology  is  more  exciting,  however, 
owing  to  the  technological  agents’  increasing  autonomy. 
Previously,  our  employment  of  technology  has  been 
purposeful and effortful: I must to first decide to place the 
pencil  correctly  when  typing  text,  and  then  perform  the 
action  to  place  it  there.  However,  automata  require  less 
continuous  control.  The  opportunity  provided  in  modern 
ambient  environments  is  that  technologies  employ 
themselves automatically as problem constraints change to 
form  part  of  new  PSSs.  The  vision  is  that  a  “team”  of 
relatively  autonomous  agents,  both  human  and 
technological, move in and out of operation dynamically as 
responses to changes in demands imposed by the variety of 
problems we face in our everyday lives. 
Figure 2. Schematic diagram of changes over time in the 
demands imposed on two different types of human 
resources by the constraints of three different problems. 
Areas labeled A, B, and C denote the resource deficits 
created by the demands imposed by problems 1, 2, and 3 
respectively. 
Figure 3. Two problem solving systems that differ in terms 
of the type and number of agents employed, and the 
interaction between agents. H denotes a human agent and 
T a technological agent.    
However, automata  have paradoxical effects. There is an 
important  shift  in  system  characteristics  when  the 
introduction  of  automata  adds  active  agents  other  than 
humans  to  PSSs.  PSSs  becomes  characterized  by 
collaboration  between  multiple  autonomous  agents  each 
performing  their  own  operations.  And  here  the  problems 
begin.  A  predominant  factor  contributing  to  PSS 
ineffectuality  is  a  lack  of  understanding  about  how  to 
achieve  collaboration  among  the  constituent  agents  and 
how to avoid the chaos that can ensue when each agent is 
capable of “being off doing its own thing” [27, 28]. 
INFORMING  THE  DESIGN  OF  HUMAN-MACHINE 
COLLABORATION THROUGH THE STUDY OF HUMAN-
HUMAN AND ANIMAL-ANIMAL COLLABORATION 
Researchers  have  recently  argued  that  insights  to  this 
problem  can  be  gained  from  studies  of  competent 
collaboration  in  other  multi-agent  systems.  Such  systems 
are found in human groups, such as work and sports teams, 
and animal groups, such as wolf packs [14, P. Feltovich, 
personal  communication,  16].  Like  our  vision  of  moving 
between  ubiquitous  multi-agent  systems  in  ambient 
technology  environments,  we  move  between  ubiquitous 
multi-agent social systems in our everyday lives, such as 
work and sport teams, and friendship and family  groups. 
Competence  models  of  human-machine  collaboration  in 
ambient  technology  environments  might  be  derived  by 
studying successful human-human collaboration [2]. 
A key characteristic of competent human collaboration is 
the  ability  to  achieve  team  coordination;  that  is,  when 
appropriate  team  members  integrate  the  appropriate 
operations at the appropriate times to form a composition of 
operations that solve a team problem or task. When faced 
with a task, an individual problem solver must possess or 
gain  knowledge  only  about  the  task  itself,  known  as 
taskwork  knowledge.  This  includes  1)  knowledge  of  the 
current task status and 2) knowledge of operations needed 
to  complete  the  task.  However,  in  order  to  achieve 
coordination,  an  individual  operating  in  a  team  that  is 
undertaking a problem or task must also gain knowledge 
about the team, known as teamwork knowledge [20]. This 
includes  3)  knowledge  of  what  operations  the  individual 
team  member  must  perform,  4)  knowledge  of  what 
operations  the  other  team  members  will  perform,  and  5) 
knowledge of how and when the individual’s operations are 
to be integrated with the other members’ operations. Thus, 
teamwork knowledge allows an individual team member to 
anticipate upcoming operations, and thus to integrate the 
appropriate operation at the appropriate time. 
The team, as a unit, also has an additional requirement: 6) 
All of the above knowledge must be the same across team 
members.  For  example,  a  two-person  team  that  includes 
you and me must meet the following criteria if we are to be 
successful at our team task: Your knowledge of what you 
are going to do and when you are going to do it must be the 
same as my knowledge of what you are going to do and 
when you are going to do it, and vice versa. Psychologists 
studying teams have adopted the term shared mental model 
(SMM) to describe when all team members have gained the 
same knowledge of the taskwork and teamwork required for 
a  given  task  [1].  An  American  football  team  could  not 
achieve  its  highly  complicated  maneuvers  without  first 
ensuring that all players have gained a SMM of its future 
operations, which is exemplified by the now general usage 
of the football coach’s question “Are we all reading from 
the same playbook?” 
Team communication is a key contributor to establishing a 
SMM  [12].  Team  members  must  use  communication  to 
establish  at  least  a  superficial  SMM  to  begin  a  solution 
attempt, and must gain feedback from agents to update their 
SMM  of  the  solution  process:  Has  an  agent 
began/completed/failed  a  given  task,  is  an  agent 
available/unavailable  for  a/another  task,  what  is  an  agent 
doing next and how long will it take? There are three key 
communication  types  that  facilitate  SMM  acquisition: 
intentional verbal (IVC) and intentional non-verbal (INC), 
and unintentional non-verbal (UNC). IVC and INC involve 
speaking  or  non-verbally  signaling  respectively  to  other 
team members in order that their SMM is kept current. IVC 
is highly flexible because humans share a vast code, which 
is  natural  language,  with  which  to  encode  and  decode 
cognitions. 
However,  UNC  is  important  in  achieving  a  SMM  and 
occurs when an individual unintentionally sends messages 
to  recipients,  which,  in  teams,  can  provide  important 
information to a member about the operations of other team 
members  [17,  21,  26].  An  sensed  operation  can  provide 
information about a change in the problem status, and or 
serve as a cue for other agents to perform operations that 
must  be  integrated  with  the  sensed  operation:  In  your 
workplace, colleagues observed gathered around a printer 
might  indicate  a  jammed  printer,  and  you  might 
immediately re-route your printing jobs without engaging in 
intentional communication with your colleagues. A critical 
contributor to acquiring a SMM in collaborative teams is 
that a given team member’s UNC is continually available to 
team members while he or she is sensible (e.g., visible): We 
can  often  see  colleagues  beginning/completing  tasks  and 
thus  synchronize  our  operations  accordingly.  A  second 
advantage of UNC is that it has few time or cognitive costs 
to the “sender” because it is incidental to their operations. 
Consider  these  concepts  with  regard  to  the  following 
example. A factory has a telephone, which rings six times 
before  switching  to  voicemail.  When  a  worker  hears  the 
telephone, she walks across the factory floor to answer it 
but  the  answer  service  cuts  in  before  she  arrives. 
Consequently,  the  live  call  is  lost.  The  machine  did  not 
know that the worker was approaching because it had no 
means  of  sensing  this,  and  the  worker  did  not  know  the 
machine would switch to voicemail because the current and 
intended  operations  of  the  machine  where  not  sensible, 
otherwise  both  agents  would  have  structured  their    
operations  differently  to  achieve  coordination. 
Consequently, human resources were wasted. 
However,  consider  the  difference  if  the  machine  was 
replaced with a secretary. Upon answering the telephone, 
the  secretary  would  check  if  anyone  was  present  before 
taking a message. Alternatively, the worker might see the 
secretary and shout, “I’ll get it”, rather than let the secretary 
answer it. However, if the secretary did not see anyone, he 
would answer the telephone and take a message. If a worker 
subsequently looked up from a desk and saw the secretary 
using the telephone and writing a note, she could shout “I’ll 
get  it”  and  then  walk  over  to  take  the  call  before  the 
secretary  rang  off.  In  these  scenarios,  the  human  agents 
gained  easily  a  SMM  of  the  each  others’  operations  by 
communicating: For example, when the worker says “I’ll 
get it”, the secretary gains knowledge that the worker will 
walk to the telephone, and thus the secretary would not take 
a  message.  Thus,  coordination  is  achieved  and  human 
resources are not wasted. 
Research  on  animal  groups  has  also  revealed  that 
coordination  depends  on  effective  inter-animal 
communication  [P.  Feltovich,  personal  communication]. 
Animals exhibit displays that, like those of humans, allow 
or  disallow  other  animals  to  collaborate  and  allow  the 
prediction of future operations [22]. For example, animals 
have ways to display a readiness of opportunity to interact, 
which includes kinds of chirping, various forms of bowing, 
“Tidbitting,”  in  which  a  morsel  of  food  is  offered,  and 
touching. By contrast, an absence of opportunity to interact 
is  indicated  by  various  forms  of  the  sticking-out-of-the-
tongue,  displaying  tongue,  chattering  barks,  and 
vocalizations  at  special  and  unusual  frequencies.  For 
species  that  depend  on  coordinated  locomotion,  such  as 
geese,  which  fly  as  a  group,  locomotion  displays  can 
indicate that the animal is about to  move,  which include 
head-tossing  in  geese  and  dances  in  honeybees,  and  is 
moving, such as various forms of vocalizations [22]. 
By  contrast,  one  frequently  documented  shortcoming  of 
automata is their poor communicative capabilities [27, 28]. 
Thus,  in  PSSs  that  characterize  ambient  technology 
environments,  the  human  agent  is  often  provided  with 
limited  information  about  the  activity  of  technological 
agents. Thus, human agents are less able to obtain a SMM 
in  PSSs  comprising  technological  agents,  exemplified  by 
statements from human agents such as “What is it doing 
now?” In turn, the coordination required for collaboration is 
undermined. 
Thus,  competence  models  of  collaborative  multi-agent 
systems have implications for design principles. Principally, 
in collaborative multi-agent endeavors, performance will be 
related  to  the  extent  to  which  all  system  agents  gain  a 
SMM. This model will pertain to the current status of the 
problem, which solution strategies are going to be adopted, 
and which agent will undertake which operation at which 
time. To help achieve this, increases  in  the autonomy of 
technological agents will require a proportionate increase in 
sensible information about their status [27, 28].  
Current technologies are often designed to provide limited 
post-performance  information  such  as  “X  is/cannot  be 
completed”,  which  is  of  limited  use  in  achieving  SMMs 
[27, 28]. Thus, technologies must include clear indicators, 
in various sensory modes, conveying continually-available 
information  about  current  and,  more  critically,  future 
operations: For example, I am un/available to be tasked; I 
can/cannot communicate with you for X minutes; this is the 
problem we are working, this is what I think we are doing 
towards solving the problem, and this is what I am doing 
towards solving the problem; this is how long I think it will 
take; this is the intended outcome; this is what I will do 
after finishing the current task; and this is what I think you 
are doing will I’m doing this. 
Consequently, human agents can anticipate the operations 
of technological agents and coordinate their own operations 
accordingly. For example, continual feedback is provided 
during file-copy operations in some disk operating systems. 
This  feedback  is  in  the  form  of  graphic  information 
indicating which file is being copied at any given time and 
the estimated remaining time required to complete the task. 
Thus, the user can gain easily knowledge about whether an 
operation  is  being  performed,  which  operation  is  being 
performed,  whether  the  operation  being  performed  is  the 
correct operation, and how long it will take. In turn, the user 
can  coordinate  their  operations  with  the  agent’s,  such  as 
commencing other tasks which will take a similar amount 
of time to complete as the file-copy task.  
A second frequently documented shortcoming of automata 
is  their  lack  of  context  sensitivity  compared  to  humans. 
Thus, automata are not only often poor communicators, but 
poor at detecting communication, and in turn are less able 
to update their equivalent of a SMM by being less able to 
sense other agents’ operations. Thus, technological agents 
must  rely  more  on  the  direct  communication  of 
environmental  context  by  human  agents  (e.g.,  through  a 
screen  interface)  than  on  sensed  changes  in  the  problem 
status and agents’ operations [18]. 
Consequently,  it  is  with  regard  to  the  communication 
required  for  collaboration  that  the  quest  for  invisible 
computing  is  questioned.  Ambient  technology  has  been 
focused  on  making  technological  agents  invisible  and 
autonomous [19]. However, the best collaborators, human 
agents,  rely  on  reciprocal  communication  to  achieve 
coordination, and, hence, in some ways, are not as invisible 
or  autonomous  as  we  would  like  technological  agents  to 
become.  All  agents  in  collaborative  systems,  such  as  the 
PSSs  that  characterize  ambient  technology  environments, 
benefit  from  the  continuous  and  accessible  sensibility  of 
other agents. Even if an invisible and autonomous computer 
was  context-sensitive  such  that  it  could  predict  what  we 
were about to do and thus “step in” to form part of a PSS to 
help us to do it,  we  would  not know that the agent  was    
going to do it. The SMM of agent operations required by all 
agents would not have been achieved, and thus coordination 
would  break  down.  Thus,  reciprocal  communication  is 
necessary for coordination [15]. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DESIGN  
In summary, studies of competent collaboration in human 
and  animal  groups  have  clear  implications  for  designing 
effective  multi-agent  PSSs  in  ambient  technology 
environments. 
1.  Design  for  teams.  Conceptualize  of  technological 
agents  as  members  of  a  “team”  of  agents  that 
constitutes  a  problem  solving  system,  rather  than  as 
stand-alone  machines  used  simply  to  off-load  work 
when convenient. 
2.  Design for availability. To enhance team functioning, 
design  to  make  the  technological  agents’  mental 
models  readily  and  continually  available  to  human 
agents,  in  contrast  to  the  silent  black  boxes  that 
characterize much of modern technology. 
3.  Design  for  prediction.  Design  agents  to  allow 
prediction:  Technological  agents  should  not  only 
convey their current operations but should also convey 
sequences  of  intended  operations,  and  provide  time 
estimates of operation completion. 
4.  Design for signaling. Use intuitive and conventional 
signaling  in  various  sensory  modes  to  convey  this 
information. 
5.  Design  for  detection.  While  a  more  challenging 
objective, technological agents should be designed to 
be  context  sensitive  enough  to  detect  other  agents’ 
operations and the problem status in order to obtain a 
SMM. 
6.  Design for visibility. Being in the background doesn't 
mean  being  invisible;  invisibility  will  lead  to 
coordination  breakdowns  in  ambient  technology 
environments. 
CONCLUSION 
To modify Mark Weiser’s original position [25], we believe 
that we should aim for the vision of multiple technologies 
working together over space and time with human agents in 
order to create PSSs that can meet the demands imposed by 
the constraints of the problems that we face throughout our 
average day. However, the agents that comprise those PSSs 
must be able to work collaboratively or ambient technology 
will  simply  introduce  omnipresent  burdens.  We  propose 
that  a  better  understanding  of  how  humans  and  animals 
collaborate  within  their  groups  will  continue  to  inform 
human-machine  collaboration  such  that  human  and 
technological agents can achieve within ambient PSSs the 
same  “seamless  coordination”  exhibited  in  wolf  pack 
hunting or superbowl football plays.  
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